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Affirmative Action and the Decline
of Intellectual Culture
Charles W. Collier
The most appropriate style in which to write history is irony.
-Arthur Schopenhauer'
A recent symposium in the Columbia Law Review conveniently encapsulates
the conventional, received wisdom on affirmative action.2 Four of the five well-
known authors intersperse war stories from the academic establishment
amongst uncritical rehearsals of their own familiar views favoring "the perva-
siveness of affirmative action in society" and "affirmative action to make ours a
better country" (to quote the two moderates). A fifth contributor apparently
runs out of things to say after six pages of asking "hard" but rudimentary
questions about affirmative action's intellectual assumptions. That four-to-
one ratio strikes me as just about right to convey the current tenor of this
academic "debate" and its intellectual articles of faith.
But when it comes to affirmative action, almost nothing is what it seems to
be. The issues at the forefront of public opinion often have little bearing on
the legal discussion. The prevailing legal doctrines and principles turn out to
be so ad hoc and undeveloped that major theoretical premises go unrefuted
in competing briefs and opinions. And the whole debate is shrouded in a thick
cloud of politics and ideology that makes any candid discussion unlikely. All in
all, not a very fruitful field to till. And I would not attempt to till it either if it
did not border on areas of the greatest importance, such as intellectual merit
and the problem of informal discrimination.'
Charles W. Collier is a professor of law and philosophy at the University of Florida.
I thank Tom Cotter,Jeff Harrison, Dick Hiers, Chris Slobogin, and Mark Tushnet for helpful
comments, suggestions, and criticisms. Allison Landgraff provided valuable research assistance.
The University of Florida College of Law supported much of my research and writing with a
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This essay was completed and submitted for publication in September 2003, well before this
symposium was organized. See Charles W. Collier, Intellectual Authority and Institutional
Authority, 42J. Legal Educ. 151, 167-85 (1992); also published in 35 Inquiry 145, 157-69 (1992).
1. 1 Der handschriftliche Nachlass, ed. Arthur HOibscher, § 156 (Frankfurt, 1966) (1814).
2. On Grutterand Gratz: Examining "Diversity" in Education, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1588 (2003).
3. See generally Charles W. Collier, Intellectual Authority and Institutional Authority, 42J.
Legal Educ. 151 (1992); Charles W. Collier, The New Logic of Affirmative Action, 45 Duke
LJ. 559 (1995) [hereinafter New Logic].
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I.
It is no accident that the furor over affirmative action has erupted once
more in the academy, gatekeeper to the intellectual world. Here the general
public has correctly noted how this gatekeeping function has taken an increas-
ingly pragmatic, utilitarian, almost antiintellectual turn. Even disregarding
affirmative action for the moment, it is truly amazing how little in a university
setting actually turns on intellectual merit. And I do not mean this only in a
negative sense.
To take a somewhat far-flung example, Paul Berman has written compel-
lingly in the New York Times Magazine on the career of Sayyid Qutb, identified
by the magazine as the "Egyptian Islamist [who] invented the terroristjihad."
It seems that Qutb composed his monumental, radical Qur'an commentary
over more than a decade on scraps of paper in ajail cell, surrounded by forty
common criminals, against the background of Nasser's recorded speeches
blared by loudspeaker twenty hours a day. "[T]his gigantic study," Berman
remarks, "must surely count as one of the most remarkable works of prison
literature ever produced."4 Whatever one may think of Qutb's ideas (and I
don't think much of them at all), one has to admire his focus, fortitude, and
determination, his single-minded perseverance in the face of adversity, his
abiding belief in himself, indeed his inspiration.
One thinks also of Karl Marx, who, at a time when he could barely clothe
his starving children or pay the rent, toiled away every day in the reading room
of the British Museum on Das Kapital (the book "to which I have sacrificed my
health, my happiness and my family"). According to a Prussian spy who
dropped by for a visit:
He lives in one of the worst and cheapest neighbourhoods in London. He
occupies two rooms. There is not one clean or decent piece of furniture in
either room, everything is broken, tattered and torn, with thick dust over
everything... manuscripts, books and newspapers lie beside the children's
toys, bits and pieces from his wife's sewing basket, cups with broken rims, dirty
spoons, knives, forks, lamps, an inkpot, tumblers, pipes, tobacco ash-all
piled up on the same table.... Sitting down is a dangerous business. Here is
a chair with only three legs, there another which happens to be whole, on
which the children are playing at cooking. That is the one that is offered
to the visitor, but the children's cooking is not removed, and if you sit down
you risk a pair of trousers. But all these things do not in the least embarrass
Marx .... 5
Of all the remarkable social critics and revolutionaries of the nineteenth
century, observes Isaiah Berlin, there was "not one so rigorously single-minded,
so absorbed in making every word and every act of his life a means towards
a single, immediate, practical end, to which nothing was too sacred to
be sacrificed."6
4. The Philosopher of Islamic Terror, N.Y. Times Magazine, Mar. 23, 2003, at 24, 27.
5. Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment, 3d ed., 194 (New York, 1963) (quoting
B. Nicolaievsky & 0. Maenchen-Helfen, Karl Marx: Man and Fighter).
6. Id. at 19.
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Somewhat in the same spirit, universities have long recognized that, while
intellectual merit may be the coin of the realm, there are other valuable
attributes. Admissions criteria have broadened to include such factors as
personal achievement, leadership, service, work experience, musical talent,
and athletic ability. Other factors commonly considered-such as socioeco-
nomic disadvantage, residency in an underrepresented geographical region,
and being an alumni child-seem to have nothing to do with merit or
achievement. Is that fair? If affirmative action is fundamentally about fairness,
then why not put race (and perhaps gender) into the mix as well?
"The true answer to this argument is, that it is irrelevant," C. C. Langdell
once wrote.7 In this context, musical talent, athletic ability, and alumni parent-
age have no legal or constitutional relevance. For example, the University of
Michigan may, if it wishes, reconstitute itself as the Michigan College of Music
and consider only musical talent in its admissions process. Or it may decide to
become the Michigan Sports Academy and consider only athletic ability. It
may even transform itself into the Michigan University for Alumni Children
Only, without running afoul of the law in any way. (There is also no constitu-
tional requirement that these factors be assessed in any particular way or
against any particular "standard," so long as the assessment is not arbitrary or
irrational.) What the State of Michigan cannot lawfully do, however, is to
rename its university the All-White Institute of Supremacy Studies and ex-
clude black students because of their race (and here the analysis must indeed
be measured against an objective legal standard).
Of all the factors discussed above, whether or not they reflect merit or achieve-
ment, only race (and, to a lesser extent, gender) has legal or constitutional
relevance in this context. Why is that? The short answer is that the Constitu-
tion says so: it confers no comparable relevance elsewhere, and its Thirteenth
Amendment (slavery), Fourteenth Amendment ("No State shall ... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"), and
Fifteenth Amendment (voting) have historically defined race as a uniquely
"suspect" legal classification.
"Why is affirmative action in universities so unpopular," asks Ronald Dworkin,
one of our greatest living liberal legal theologians, "when it seems to be
working so well?"' (That is a little like asking, "Why is the guillotine so
unpopular when it seems to be working so well?") Evidently, Dworkin has not
been talking with people like Jennifer Gratz and Barbara Grutter, white
plaintiffs in the University of Michigan cases. Imagine their puzzlement upon
learning that the university's stated aspiration of "achiev[ing] that diversity
which has the potential to enrich everyone's education"' did not apply to
them. Affirmative action was "working so well" at Michigan that they could not
participate in that resounding success at all. They could only watch it from
outside in the cold, their noses pressed forlornly against the windowpanes of
7. A Summary of the Law of Contracts, 2d ed., § 15 (Boston, 1880).
8. Race and the Uses of Law, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 2001, atA17.
9. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2332 (2003) (quoting the Michigan law school's official
admissions policy).
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the great university, left to gather what crumbs they could at less distinguished
institutions. These plaintiffs say that they too have been excluded because of
their race. In the face of this equal protection challenge, it will not do to say
that affirmative action "seems to be working so well." Strong public policy
presumptions render all racial classifications inherently suspect.
II.
Or at least that is how the argument would have gone, before the recent
University of Michigan decisions. But now a powerful countervailing factor
has been added to the arsenal of the state: its newly announced "compelling
interest" in obtaining "the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body.""0 That interest is hardly intuitively obvious; indeed one might
have assumed much more plausibly that, if universities have any "compelling"
interest at all, it is in selecting the most academically qualified students and
faculty. But what was once a matter of educational policy has now been
transformed into a constitutionally controlling factor. In the formulaic terms
of constitutional parlance, if the state has a "compelling interest" in engaging
in some form of racial discrimination, and if the racial classification at issue
fits and furthers that interest "with greater precision than any alternative
means,"" then the state's measure may be upheld even in the face of an equal
protection challenge.
Previously the "compelling interest" designation had been reserved for
matters of "pressing public necessity" like national security,"i danger to life or
limb,i" and remedying past discrimination. 4 For example, a prison might
temporarily segregate prisoners by race in order to head off a race riot, where
there would otherwise be a very real chance that someone (perhaps many
people) would be killed. The "compelling interest" here is in preventing
deaths, so this measure should survive the "strict scrutiny" of classifications
that involve racial discrimination." But if a high school principal wanted to
separate students by race at their graduation ceremonyjust because it "looked
better," that would not be considered a compelling interest and the measure
would not be upheld. 6
The significance of this distinction can be seen in a case involving a federal
prisoner's petition for special meals to accommodate his religious beliefs. As a
10. Id. at 2338 (quoting Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. [hereinafter Respondents' Brief]).
11. Id. at 2365 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Wygant v.Jackson Board of Education, 476
U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.)).
12. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("Pressing public necessity may
sometimes justify the existence of [racial discrimination]; racial antagonism never can.").
13. Cf. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
14. Cf. Richmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989).
15. Cf. Washington, 390 U.S. at 334 (Black, Harlan & Stewart,Jj., concurring) ("prison authorities
have the right, acting in good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take into account
racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good ordet in prisons and jails").
16. This example is suggested by Paul Brest & Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking, 3d ed., 655 (Boston, 1992).
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law clerk I drafted an order that wondered skeptically whether the prison had
"any compelling reason" not to grant this seemingly simple request. Imagine
our surprise in chambers when we received, almost by return mail, a full-
fledged brief on the merits arguing that the correct standard was not the
"compelling interest" test but some lower standard, easier for the prison to
meet. At the time I marveled at the power of a law clerk's casual choice of
terminology. But really it was the power of the formula at work, the standard
of "compelling" interests I had inadvertently invoked.
In the Michigan law school case, the Court allowed the law school to
consider applicants' race in assembling a sufficiently diverse entering class.
But no one argues that Michigan has a compelling interest in racial diversity as
such. That would be more of an aesthetic interest (as in the high school
example above), an interest in proportionality for its own sake, an irrational
obsession with symmetry. (" [O]utright racial balancing," the Court notes, "is
patently unconstitutional." 7 ) Instead, the compelling interest in diversity is
really an interest in intellectual diversity, in the "diversity of viewpoints." The
law school seeks to include students with "a perspective different from that of
members of groups which have not been... historically discriminated against.""8
Even diverse experiences must somehow be translated into diverse views (per-
spectives, outlooks, beliefs, frames of reference, background assumptions,
intellectual styles, worldviews, "ways of worldmaking," etc.) if they are to offer
any conceivable educational benefits. (For educational purposes, experiences
that leave no mark in the mind might just as well never have occurred; the
mere "presence of persons who have had such experiences" does nothing, in
and of itself, to "enrich [] the educational environment."19 ) Just as growing up
in a particular region or having particular professional experiences is likely to
affect an individual's views," explains the Court, "so too is one's own, unique
experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race
unfortunately still matters."2" But rather than getting at those views directly,
the law school is allowed to get at them indirectly (presumably because
viewpoints are too complicated, obscure, or perhaps even unknowable) by
considering and using race as a proxy.
And here we come to a fundamental premise of the whole argument, which
may be stated in the form of a thesis.
Thesis: Race serves as a (good) proxy for viewpoint.
If this thesis were not valid, then the law school would have no reason to think
minority students could offer "a perspective different from that of members of
groups which have not been ... historically discriminated against." There
would be no reason to think underrepresented viewpoints were lurking in
underrepresented racial groups: those underrepresented viewpoints could be
found just as easily in any racial group.
17. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
18, Id. at 2334.
19. Respondents' Brief, supra note 10, at 24.
20. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
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But merely to have stated this thesis is to have drawn attention to its flaws. It
makes the very questionable assumption that viewpoints are associated with
and ultimately determined by race. The proxy thesis holds that racial minori-
ties, as a class, differ generically from nonminorities as to experiences and
viewpoints; this group characteristic is supposed to be shared by all individuals
in the class. The proxy thesis thus assumes-has to assume-that on any given
issue there is something like a "black viewpoint," for example. Any such
stereotype is an insult to the intelligence of free and independent-minded
people of all races.
As the Court has repeatedly acknowledged, persons of all races can and do
experience unlawful racial discrimination. 1 "Minority students draw as wide a
range of conclusions from experiences like these," notes the law school, "as
white students do from their own lives and influences. '22 In other words,
viewpoints are no more determined by experiences-even racial experiences-
than they are by race itself. Neither serves as a good proxy for viewpoint; and
viewpoints (in the broad way I have defined them, as various forms shaping
intellectual content) are what matter in education.
If the proxy thesis cannot be sustained, then perhaps its antithesis can.
Antithesis: Race does not serve as a (good) proxy for viewpoint.
This antithesis negates the whole rationale for using race as a way of getting at
viewpoints in order to attain diversity of viewpoints. If viewpoints are not
closely tied to race, then the use of race is not (to use the canonical terminol-
ogy) a "narrowly tailored" way to attain this diversity. Instead it is a clumsy,
crude, haphazard way, so affirmative action cannot satisfy the demanding
terms of review outlined above or overcome the strong public policy presump-
tions against racial classifications.
The proxy thesis assumes that all racial minorities have at least one thing in
common, that they differ significantly from nonminorities as to experiences
and viewpoints. The antithesis assumes that individual minorities, as free and
unique individuals, "draw as wide a range of conclusions" and differ just as
much from one another as nonminorities do. Both of these contradictory proposi-
tions are essential to the case for racial preferences; both must be rejected, however,
to make that case.
Here the very logic of affirmative action begins to unravel. If a thesis highly
relevant to affirmative action's core assumptions cannot be sustained, and if
the exact opposite of that thesis is also incompatible with those assumptions,
then we are no longer in the realm of rational arguments. Instead we are
dealing with an ideology (in the dictionary definition, "the body of doctrine,
myth, belief, etc., that guides an individual, social movement, institution, class,
or large group" 3 ) that draws on deep sources in history, culture, and good
intentions. As the University of Michigan acknowledges in its brief, racial
21. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427 (2003) (citing and quoting earlier cases).
22. Respondents' Brief, supra note 10, at 24.
23. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2d unabridged ed., 950 (New York,
1987).
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preferences are "woven into the fabric of our 'national culture."'24 When is the
last time a rational argument was described that way?
The ideology of affirmative action is reflected in the practice of what I have
elsewhere termed "informal discrimination."25 The difference between formal
and informal discrimination is the difference between Michigan's unconstitu-
tional undergraduate affirmative action plan (which automatically penalized
all white and Asian applicants 20 points, out of 150) and its constitutional law
school plan (which operates without such an explicit penalty). I am not sure
why the unguided (and hence unreviewable) discretion of an admissions
officer is supposed to be an improvement over a 20-point racial penalty. And
why would the Court trust the very same administrators who came up with the
20-point racial penalty not to mentally assign an even greater penalty under a
purely discretionary scheme? Nicholas Lemann provides a clue: "[E]verybody
from President Bush on down likes the result of an integrated leadership, but
finds the way it was achieved distasteful and therefore doesn't want to know
too much about the details." 6 In other words, the justices do not want to
know, in any detail, how affirmative action plays out in real life; so they uphold
a purely discretionary plan whereby the actual decision-making process re-
mains unknowable (and hence unreviewable). In this way the Court has set
itself up for another round of water-coolerjokes about the "nuanced, holistic
consideration of race" in university admissions.27
But seriously, what would the "nuanced, holistic consideration of race"
mean? And why would it matter, if intellectual diversity is the objective? An
admissions official reviewing minority applications might reason as follows:
"Candidate represents the black viewpoint very well; very articulate. Admission
recommended." But the same official might also reason in a different case:
"Candidate doesn't represent the black viewpoint at all; very refreshing.
Admission recommended. "Between these extremes there is no conceivable view-
point that could not be used to justify the same result. (The Michigan law
school, in its own words, "looks for minority applicants who say interesting
things about the ways that race has, or has not, influenced their lives."'28 That
certainly sounds like a win-win proposition.) In other words, the outcome is
not determined by factual data or objective factors, by empirical evidence in
the scientific sense.2 9 The more "individualized" the inquiry, the more discre-
tionary the result. In this context, statistical proof of discrimination (like that
used in employment, jury service, voting, and redistricting cases) would be of
24. Gratz, Brief for Respondents Bollinger et al. 17.
25. See Collier, New Logic, supra note 3, at 573-78.
26. A Decision That Universities Can Relate To, N.Y. TimesJune 29,2003, § 4 (Week in Review),
at 14.
27. See, e.g., Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2343, 2345; Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2432 (O'Connor,J, concurring),
2441 (Souter,J., dissenting).
28. Respondents' Brief, supra note 10, at 37.
29. Cf. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 5th ed., 36-39 (London, 1989) (falsifiability as
a fundamental criterion of scientific knowledge).
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no avail, since the Court acknowledges that some degree of discrimination is
permissible, but simply declines to specify that degree.
We can nevertheless plot out a rough spectrum of discretion as follows,
from highest to lowest:
Choosing a spouse
Appointing a faculty member
Admitting a student
The discrimination, racial or otherwise, involved in choosing a spouse is of
course in principle unreviewable; but it is also interesting to note the lack of
any successful faculty appointments challenges at the college or university
level." Precisely where student admissions fits on this spectrum has deliber-
ately been made obscure. But no money will be lost betting that it is now much
closer to faculty appointments than it has ever been.
The rule of law entails what Learned Hand once described in correspon-
dence thus:
I myself think it is a little more manageable and quite adequate a distinction
to say that there is an absolute and objective test to language.... Once you
admit that the matter is one of degree.., you give to Tomdickandharry, D.J.,
so much latitude that the jig is at once up.... I own I should prefer a
qualitative formula, hard, conventional, difficult to evade."'
Objective, factual criteria and empirical falsifiability are the building blocks of
that construct. Objective knowledge depends on general laws; the individual
is, strictly speaking, unknowable. Individuum est ineffabile.
But perhaps, given the Court's unprecedented deference to the law school's
"educationaljudgment," affirmative action has now been redefined as more of
an art than a science. In that case, comparisons with the "opinion privilege" in
First Amendment law would be apt. Justice Powell once wrote that "[u] nder
the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea, ' 32 a statement that
now seems directly applicable to the inscrutable opinions of university admis-
sions officers (at least those busily engaged in the "flexible assessment" and
"highly individualized, holistic review"33 of each applicant's file). Just as affir-
mative action was (according to that very same justice Powell) never intended
to remedy broad "societal" discrimination,34 the new regime of informal
discrimination is insulated from legal review precisely because it reflects a
broad social ideology-"woven into the fabric of our 'national culture"'-
rather than the invidious, factually demonstrable misapplication of standards
by any particular individual. Now there are no enforceable standards to be
30. For an imaginative discussion of this issue, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Reverse Discrimina-
tion and Law School Faculty Hiring: The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 993 (1993).
31. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 719,763, 770 (1975) (letters from Learned Hand
to Zechariah ChafeeJr., Dec. 3, 1919 &Jan. 2, 1921).
32. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
33. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2331, 2343.
34. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978) (opinion of Powell,J.).
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applied or misapplied, except perhaps the "standard" of chacun t son gofit. The
admissions officer who proclaims "I know a good applicant when I see one"
has satisfied all legal and constitutional requirements. De gustibus non est
disputandum.3 5 One cannot base a discrimination action on the generalized
suspicion, however well founded, that most admissions officers view and
interpret the world in a way favorable to minority applicants.
"[I]n the nature of things," explains the Court, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based up-
on color."
[T]here must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legisla-
ture.... [I]t is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of
their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order....
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions
based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in
accentuating the difficulties of the present situation.
(That was from the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, vintage 1896.) 6
Lurking in the background of the affirmative action debate was always the
issue of intellectual standards. Some universities are now ending the use of
standardized aptitude tests and admitting a set percentage of high school
graduates, regardless of their qualifications. These trends should eventually
converge to make traditional forms of affirmative action unnecessary. Thus,
among both proponents of affirmative action and those who would replace it,
there seems to be a broad social, political, and ideological consensus that
intellectual standards are overrated and, in the present circumstances, dis-
pensable. 7 Far from facing what the Michigan law school terms "a stark choice
between racial diversity and radically lower academic standards and ambi-
tions,"s we can actually have both!
III.
A huge number of amicus briefs were filed in the Michigan cases, many
from business groups and governmental organizations. Justice O'Connor was
obviously deeply impressed by what she saw as an outpouring of societal
support for affirmative action. For example, she cites briefs from the 3M
Corporation and General Motors Corporation for the proposition that "major
American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increas-
35. Cf. Presidio Enterprises, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distributing Corp., 784 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.
1986).
36. 163 U.S. 537, 544, 550-51 (1896).
37. See generally Jeffrey Rosen, How I Learned to Love Quotas, N.Y. Times Magazine, June 1,
2003, at 52 (arguing that "[blecause universities will take race into account regardless of what
the court decides, the court should allow them to do so openly, in ways that won't destroy
their admissions standards, rather than forcing them to lie, in ways that will harm society as a
whole"); cf. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("One can reasonably
anticipate ... that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their minority enrollment
... whether or not they can do so in full candor.").
38. Respondents' Brief, supra note 10, at 19.
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ingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." 9
In a sense, the real basis for the decision is society's interest in diversity, not
the university's. It goes (almost) without saying, however, that "society" is not a
party in the case. And what would it mean for you or me or even the University
of Michigan law school to have a "compelling interest" in the general welfare
of society (or in "improving the racial mix of different dimensions of Ameri-
can leadership for everyone's benefit," as Dworkin puts it 40)? If that is a
compelling interest, then so is "mak[ing] ours a better country '41 or even
"making the world a better place."
Justice O'Connor places special emphasis on an amicus brief filed by a
group of retired military officers. ("Analogizing to the military was obviously a
brilliant possibility," explains Lee Bollinger, lead defendant in both Michigan
cases, "not only because of the respect accorded the military in society, but
also, and in my judgment more importantly, because it emphatically rein-
forced the theme of the pervasiveness of affirmative action in society."42)
These officers assert in their brief that, "[b]ased on [their] decades of experi-
ence," a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the
military's ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide national security."
The officers note that one of the primary sources for the nation's officer corps
is the Reserve Officers Training Corps program based in the universities.
According to the officers, however, "the military cannot achieve an officer
corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless ... the ROTC
use [s] limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies."
43
It seems that during the 1960s and 1970s, while racial integration increased
the percentage of minorities in the enlisted ranks, their representation in the
officer corps remained low. "This deficiency in the officer corps and the
discrimination perceived to be its cause.., seriously threatened the military's
ability to function effectively and fulfill its mission to defend the nation." The
armed forces came to see the ROTC as "the 'obvious solution' to the problems
created by the lack of minority representation in the officer corps," since the
ROTC employs "an aggressive race-conscious admissions program."44
The Court explicitly endorses these military officers' conclusion that "[i] t
requires only a small step from this analysis to conclude that our country's
other most selective institutions must remain both diverse and selective." In
other words, the success of the military's affirmative action programs depends
upon affirmative action in the universities.
39. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340.
40. Ronald Dworkin, The Court and the University: An Exchange, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 14,
2003, at 56, 57.
41. Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1610,
1621 (2003).
42. Lee C. Bollinger, A Comment on Grutterand Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1589,1594
(2003).
43. Brief for Lt. Gen.Julius W. Becton Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae 5.
44. Id. at 6-7, 25.
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These institutions must have sufficient minority enrollment so that their
ROTC programs can, in turn, train and educate substantial numbers of
qualified minority officers and provide officer candidates with a racially
diverse educational experience.... [R]acial diversity in higher education...
is essential to ensuring an effective, battle-ready fighting force.
4
1
The universities must therefore do their part, concludes the Court, "to culti-
vate a set of leaders with legitimacy.""
You know something is amiss when retired military officers are cited ap-
provingly in a Supreme Court opinion about university law school admissions
policies. Since when do we take our marching orders from those guys? Clearly,
Justice O'Connor has aligned herself and the Court with "major American
businesses" and tied the fate of the universities to the needs of what used to be
called the "military-industrial complex." But since when is it in any way the
universities' mission to shore up the "legitimacy" of the military-industrial
complex or facilitate its efficient functioning? Since when is it the universities'
role to provide "an effective, battle-ready fighting force"? And since when is
the ROTC program their raison d'itre?
Quite to the contrary, one of the key historic roles of the university has
been to place openly in question the legitimacy and public morality of war-
fare, both in specific contexts and in general. Another main function of a
university is to cultivate habits of independent thinking and encourage critical
reexamination of materialistic values underlying the corporate and industrial
worlds. This is the "critical thinking" our university catalogs routinely advertise
(though apparently they do not want it to get too critical ... ). The point of a
liberal education is to change military and corporate culture, not to learn how
to fit in.
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Justice O'Connor thus gets it exactly backwards in viewing universities as
part of the pipeline supplying a cadre of efficient, dutiful, and above all
diverse administrators for the military-industrial establishment. These are not
the kind of people who raise impertinent and unsettling questions or think
out loud at impolitic times (on the battlefield, for instance). But Justice
O'Connor has to have this vision of the universities in order to argue convinc-
ingly for their "compelling interest" (which is really society's interest) in
diversity. The military connection transforms a high school civics lesson ("stu-
dents learn there is no 'minority viewpoint' but rather a variety of viewpoints
among minority students"4 8 ) into what the Court accepts as a matter of
"national security"-one of the traditional compelling interests.
The historic ideal of the university-patron of pure, basic research, advanc-
ing knowledge for its own sake, pursuing truth and beauty wherever they
lead-was probably always to some extent a myth. The ideal flourished in the
German research universities of the nineteenth century and in the liberal arts
45. Id. at 29, 28, 27.
46. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
47. Cf. Owen Barfield, Worlds Apart (Middletown, Conn., 1963); Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach
(Leipzig, 1845).
48. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2334.
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colleges of Oxbridge and New England; but Hitler's Nazi universities provided
the inevitable rude awakening.49 Still, it is no argument against attempting to
attain the ideal that it has never been or may never be perfectly realized.
According to the logic of second-best, something short of perfection may in
many contexts be the best possible outcome. 50 Certainly the fact that efforts to
attain the ideal fall short of it should provide no excuse to abandon those
efforts altogether.
An ideal university, Justice O'Connor seems to be saying, is a luxury we
cannot afford or even aspire to. Instead, a better model would be that of the
prison, which (as mentioned above) might have a "compelling interest" in
temporarily segregating prisoners by race, in order to head off a (potentially
lethal) race riot. Prisons are institutions that operate at a kind of subsistence
level; they do not have the luxury of undertaking broad intellectual initiatives
that might work at cross-purposes to their primary mission of keeping every-
one within their walls (at least) alive. If, asJustice O'Connor suggests, univer-
sities are the handmaidens of the military, then their aspirations mightjustifi-
ably be limited to reflect the more basic, utilitarian needs of their military
masters. And if, as seems quite plausible, the legitimacy of military authority
depends crucially on a diverse, multiracial officer corps, then who better to
provide that legitimacy and authority than the universities?
Since justice O'Connor raises the military connection herself, another
comparison that might be pursued is our current efforts at nation building in
the rather primitive conditions of Iraq. One of the main points of contention
early on was the military's failure to protect irreplaceable cultural artifacts and
antiquities in the National Museum of Iraq.5 The military's eminently reason-
able response was that it had more important things to do at the time, e.g.,
fight a war. Admittedly, a more fine-tuned military plan would have included
specific measures for the protection of cultural artifacts. But from the perspec-
tive of the military, these are at best marginal issues as to how fine-tuned a plan
to develop; the pragmatic exigencies of warfare do not allow for these to
become core concerns. From the perspective of the cultural institutions
involved, however, the safety of their collections is a fundamental premise and
precondition of their very existence, not a luxury. A military may be needed to
protect both museums and universities, but those institutions cannot flourish
under conditions tied to the immediate demands of survival. They operate on
a higher cultural plane.
49. See generallyJohn Henry Newman, The Idea of a University, ed. 1. T. Ker (Oxford, 1976)
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Affirmative Action and the Decline of Intellectual Culture
IV.
Justice O'Connor's distant memories of higher education do not serve her
well. There is plenty of blame to go around, however, and not all of it should
be heaped indiscriminately upon her. The Court has never said that affirma-
tive action is mandatory, only that it is permissible. And it is not quite accurate
to say thatJustice O'Connor has determined the universities' role or imposed
one on them. In reality, it is a role they have willingly embraced. As Lemann
observes, "Universities adopted affirmative action not just voluntarily, but
enthusiastically and passionately."52
Toward the end of her opinion Justice O'Connor cautions that "racial
classifications, however compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous
that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands."53
Undeterred by that danger, however, she then proceeds to a rather broad
agenda of her own:
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to
further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public higher
education.... We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.54
Justice O'Connor writes in the grand, majestic style of someone who has
plenty of time, someone perhaps planning to fill out her golden years moni-
toring the progress of her extravagant cultural speculations. Presumably no
one now alive will benefit much from the projected restoration of constitu-
tional rights in 2028, but for those who are really, really patient I sound this
note of agreement with Justice O'Connor. In 2028 affirmative action will
indeed be a thing of the past; it will no longer be needed to ensure diversity,
because the standards of merit and achievement that affirmative action cir-
cumvents will no longer be in general use. Legal scholars will still be admiring
"the curvature of constitutional space," but the general public, led by its
most insightful and inspiring movie stars, will have long since reached its
own conclusions.
52. Lemann, supra note 26, at 14.
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